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An exploration of metacognition and its effect on mathematical
performance in differential equations
Mary Jarratt Smith1
Abstract: Research suggests that students in certain contexts who are
“metacognitively aware learners” demonstrate better academic performance
(Shraw & Dennison, 1994; Md. Yunus & Ali, 2008). In this research, the
metacognitive levels for two classes of differential equations students were
studied. Students completed a survey adapted from the Metacognitive Awareness
Inventory (MAI) (Shraw & Dennison, 1994) at the start of the course. The
questions chosen from the MAI were aimed at three components concerning the
students’ knowledge about their cognition: declarative knowledge, procedural
knowledge, and conditional knowledge. Analysis shows student performance, as
measured by the course grade, cannot be predicted by metacognitive awareness
levels.
Key Words: Metacognition, MAI, differential equations
I. Introduction.
Metacognition is a person’s ability to understand how s/he thinks, reflect upon one’s thinking,
and control one’s learning based upon the understanding of and reflection on one’s thinking
(Shraw & Dennison, 1994). Flavell (1976) considered metacognition remembering to remember,
and then monitoring and updating knowledge. Cross and Steadman (1996) believe that, though a
person knows his or her strengths and weaknesses, s/he needs to take the next steps—the
metacognitive steps—of planning how to approach a problem, checking for understanding, and
testing for learning. These steps have been described by Nelson and Narens (1990, 1994) as a
metacognitive system with two basic levels—the meta-level and the object-level. Information
flows between the levels to monitor a person’s learning process (object-level to meta-level) and
control what a person does to enhance their learning (meta-level to object-level). The
information flow process in the metacognitive system could also be thought of as knowledge
about cognition (monitor) and regulation of cognition (control) (Shraw & Dennison, 1994).
In the concept of self-regulated study, as a student studies, s/he monitors his/her learning
by using a variety of metacognitive judgments (for example, Ease-of-Learning (EOL),
Judgments of Learning (JOL), Feeling of Knowing (FOK)) (Dunlosky, Serra, & Baker, 2007).
Then the student decides (or uses controls) to continue to study based on the judgments that were
made. In the hierarchical model proposed by Theide and Dunlocky (1999) students regulate
their learning through planning and goal-setting. In this model, students set a high or low goal in
terms of how much they feel they need to master and pre-plan their study time to accomplish
their goal. In another model, Region of Proximal Learning, by Metcalfe and Kornell (2004)
students regulate their learning through first choosing what items to study or not study, then stop
studying an item when they feel that they are no longer learning anything about that item. Other
researchers have determined that not all students use metacognitive knowledge to control their
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learning (Son & Metcalfe, 2000) or that the metacognitive knowledge may not be consciously
used to enhance learning (Reder & Schunn, 1996; Siegler & Shipley, 1995).
Some research suggests that students who are “metacognitively aware learners”
demonstrate better academic performance. Schraw and Dennison (1994) generated an inventory
(Metacognitive Awareness Inventory--MAI) that examined metacognitive awareness and was
deemed suitable for use with young people and adults. They tested their instrument on
undergraduate students in several introductory educational psychology courses at a midwestern
university. Schraw and Dennison concluded, among other things, that students with high scores
on the inventory also scored high on reading comprehension exams. Other researchers,
Md.Yunus and Ali (2008), used the MAI to test mathematics education students in their final
year at a university in Malaysia. Their research studied the relationship between metacognition
and gender and cumulative GPA of the students. Their findings indicated that procedural,
declarative, and conditional knowledge (that is, components of the knowledge about cognition
(Shraw & Dennison, 1994)) have “significant correlation to performance in mathematics and
overall academic performance” (p. 129) and that “metacognitive scores can predict students’
achievement to a certain extent” (p. 130).
Other research, however, has shown that higher metacognitive awareness did not lead to
higher scores academically. Pressley and Ghatala (1990) studied students at the university level
and at the elementary school level with respect to reading comprehension. Students at both of
these levels were asked to read something and judge their performance on questions about the
reading. In a variety of experiments at both elementary and university levels they found that “a
lot of cognition is not very efficient” (p. 31) and though students may be monitoring their
studying, poor monitoring contributed to poor performance. Their research suggests that students
must be both metacognitively aware and proficient at applying this awareness in their studying.
Studies also indicate that few students engage in the processes of metacognition in a
manner that would help them be successful at problem solving. Schoenfeld (1992) examined
how students worked through problems that were not familiar to them and found that many spent
very little or no time on planning during problem solving. Students would read the problem,
consider some method of solution and use it without regard to whether it was leading them to a
solution. Stillman and Galbraith (1998) identified the same lack of planning by students in their
research. Schoenfeld (1985) also found that students, when they saw that a strategy was not
working, threw it completely away and did not consider what they learned from that strategy as
they moved on to another strategy.
Various other researchers have also noted the importance of planning in problem solving.
Lester (1982) notes that to be a successful problem solver a person needs to know and
understand his/her own cognitions and be able to monitor the thought processes throughout the
solving of the problem. Silver (1982, 1987) suggests that the strategies used to solve a problem
are metacognitive and guide how the process proceeds. In particular a person’s beliefs about
learning and mathematics can greatly impact how a person solves a mathematical problem.
Veenmen (2006) believes that initially in the process of solving a mathematics problem,
metacognitive skills are more important than intellectual ability and that a student needs an
“adequate repertoire” of metacognitive skills to insure success in problem solving.
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II. Inquiry.
For many years the author has observed some students who approach their learning very
intentionally, systematically using their time and effort. A portion of these students performed
very well, while other students did not. Conversely, some students who did well appeared to
have a very haphazard approach to their learning. These anecdotal observations led the author to
investigate how her students’ knowledge about their cognition related to their performance, as
measured by course grades, in a differential equations course. In particular, the author was
interested in their declarative knowledge (knowing what is important to learn), their procedural
knowledge (understanding how to use strategies from past experiences), and their conditional
knowledge (knowing when what strategy is most effective). The author felt that perhaps
successful students, however they approached their learning, were using metacognitive tools that
less successful students were not.
The study is focused on students enrolled in differential equations, a course which requires
students to have completed two prerequisite semesters of calculus. The author has taught
courses in differential equations for 25 years, most of which have involved sections of
approximately 35 students. In the spring of 2010 and the spring of 2011, trial versions of “large
sections” (89 students and 120 students, respectively) of differential equations for engineering
majors were offered. These courses became the focus of this study.
This study focused on the following research question:
• Do a student’s metacognitive levels predict his/her course performance, as measured
by course grade, in a differential equations course?
III. Methods.
The subjects for the study were students in two university junior level differential equations
courses, from different semesters, with the majority of students majoring in engineering. As
Nelson and Narens (1990) suggest, the main tool to generate data about a person’s metacognition
is from their own reports about their thinking. Hence, students’ metacognitive levels were
assessed using a survey. The survey was adapted from the Metacognitive Awareness Inventory
or MAI, (Shraw & Dennison, 1994) which is considered a reliable measure of knowledge of
cognition (Sanchez-Alonso & Vovides, 2007). The survey used a subset of 17 questions that
were specific to the three areas of knowledge the author intended to study. Each question asked
students to indicate their perception of the truth of the statement along a continuous scale from 0
to 100, with zero corresponding to completely false and 100 corresponding to completely true.
Scores on the survey were translated to a scale of 0 to 10 for the analyses. The survey is attached
(see Appendix) with notations added to show how the questions related to the areas of
knowledge being tested (as indicated in the MAI). The survey was administered in the first two
weeks of the semester and was counted as one homework assignment.
In the analyses below, only data from students who finished the courses are included (70
from spring 2010 (Class 1) and 105 from spring 2011 (Class 2)). Students consented to have
their data included in the study and the methodology was approved by the university’s
Institutional Review Board.
To answer the research question, the author compared summative scores on the revised
MAI instrument using equal interval division to indicate low, moderate, and high metacognition.
Data were compared using descriptive statistics. Unpaired Student’s t-tests were used to
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determine any significant differences in means of the data. Cohen’s d was calculated to
determine effect size for means that were significantly different. Mann-Whitney tests were used
to determine any statistical significance between the medians of the data. The two-sample F-test
was used to determine any differences between variances of the data.
IV. Results.
To get a sense of students’ levels of metacognition when they enter a differential equations
course, the survey data from the classes were combined and the metacognitive scores were
considered.
The summative metacognition scores were broken into three subintervals indicating low,
moderate, and high metacognition for the three categories of metacognition being examined.
Table 1 gives the percentage of students, in the classes combined, with scores in each of the
subintervals.
Table 1. Subintervals of Low, Moderate, and High Summative Metacognition Scores with
Percentage of Students in each Subinterval (175 students).
Low

Moderate

High

Declarative
Percentage

40-52
13.1

53-66
56.5

67-79
30.3

Procedural
Percentage

14-22
5.7

23-31
49.7

32-40
44.6

Conditional
Percentage

20-29
11.4

30-40
49.7

41-50
38.9

Research Question: Do a student’s metacognitive levels predict his/her course performance, as
measured by course grade, in a differential equations course?
This question was studied within classes to account for any differences in the grading of
the two classes. Students who received an F for the course and completed surveys were not
considered because of the small number of them (4 in Class 1 and 2 in Class 2).
Figures 1 through 3 give the percentage of students, by grade received in the class, in the
low, moderate, and high subintervals for each category of metacognition studied for both classes.
(The ranges of scores for the subintervals are as noted in Table 1.)
For each class individually, the Student’s t-test was used to compare the means of the
metacognitive scores between students with differing grades. No significant differences were
found in Class 1. In Class 2 significant differences were found between students receiving a B in
the course and those receiving a C in the course in the categories of declarative and conditional
metacognition. Class 2 also showed significant differences in means in all metacognitive
categories when comparing C students to D students. Tables 2 and 3 give those results.
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Figure 1. Percentage of students in the low, moderate, and high subintervals for declarative
metacognition, by grade in class.
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Figure 2. Percentage of students in the low, moderate, and high subintervals for procedural
metacognition, by grade in class.
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Figure 3. Percentage of students in the low, moderate, and high subintervals for conditional
metacognition, by grade in class.
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Table 2. T-test and Cohen’s D Information for Mean Metacognitive Scores, for B and C
students, Class 2.
Grade
Mean
p
d
Effect Size

Declarative
B
C
63.8
58.0
0.00155
0.74061
0.34726

Conditional
B
C
38.6
35.7
0.036481
0.47439
0.23079

Table 3. T-test and Cohen’s D Information for Mean Metacognitive Scores, for C and D
students, Class 2 (34 C students and 15 D students).
Grade
Mean
p
d
Effect Size

Declarative
C
D
58.0
63.4
0.028988
-0.72913
-0.34251

Procedural
C
D
29.3
32.3
0.047864
-0.66258
-0.31448

Conditional
C
D
35.7
41.1
0.007015
-0.90727
-0.41311

Mann-Whitney tests run to compare the medians of the metacognition scores for each
class between students with differing grades in the course showed no significant differences in
Class 1. Class 2 had significant differences in all metacognition categories between C and D
students. Table 4 gives those results.
Table 4. Mann-Whitney U Test Information for Median Metacognitive Scores, for C and D
students, Class 2 (34 C students and 15 D students).
Grade
Median
p
U

Declarative
C
D
56
63
0.006934
352.5

Procedural
C
D
30
33
0.033408
353.0

Conditional
C
D
36
43
0.033462
389.5

Because D students had higher metacognitive levels than C students in Class 2, the
calculus I and calculus II grades for C and D students were compared to determine whether C
students came into differential equations with higher content knowledge than D students, thus
indicating that perhaps prior knowledge had a greater effect on their performance than their
metacognitive levels. It was found that there were statistically significant differences in the
mean scores which C and D students received in these courses. However, D students had a
statistically higher mean in calculus I, while C students had a statistically higher mean in
calculus II. Table 5 shows the results. In the calculation of the mean grade for C students in
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calculus I, three students were not included as they received credit for this course using the
results of an AP exam or something similar. The mean grade is based on a 4 point grade scale.
Table 5. T-test and Cohen’s D Information for Mean Metacognitive Scores, for C and D
students, Class 2, in Calculus I (31 C students and 15 D students) and Calculus II (34 C students
and 15 D students).

Grade
Mean
p
d
Effect Size

Calculus I

Calculus II

C
D
2.49
2.95
0.0354
-0.59641
-0.28577

C
D
2.52
2.24
0.0309
0.56497
0.27184

Because Class 1 had no significant differences in mean or median metacognitive scores
between students with differing grades in the course and Class 2 did, the classes were compared
to see if any insights concerning that would arise. When comparing the classes by grade received
in the classes and the students’ calculus preparation, no significant differences were found. When
the classes were compared by grade in the class and their metacognitive scores, the only
significant difference occurred between C students and their declarative metacognition ,with
Class 2 having the higher metacognitive scores in that area (p = 0.0147, d = 0.659, Effect size =
0.2669).
V. Discussion.
The metacognitive levels for two classes of differential equations students were studied. The
classes were combined to get a sense of the metacognitive levels of students as they enter
differential equations. The classes were considered on their own to determine whether the
metacognitive scores could predict course performance.
The metacognition scores for all students in the study were broken into three subintervals
indicating low, moderate, and high metacognition for the three categories of metacognition being
examined. Though the majority of students were in the moderate subinterval for all categories,
over 40% of the students were in the high subinterval for procedural metacognition
(understanding how to use past strategies) and nearly 40% of the students were in the high
category for conditional metacognition (knowing which strategy is most effective).
It would appear that students came into the differential equations classes with very
reasonable levels of metacognition, in general.
No significant differences were found in the mean and median metacognitive scores for
students in Class 1 with differing grades. However, the statistical analyses show B and C
students in Class 2 differed significantly in their mean metacognitive scores in knowing what
was important to learn (declarative knowledge), and in knowing what strategy is most effective
(conditional knowledge), with B students having higher means.
The C and D students from Class 2 also had significantly different mean and median
metacognitive scores in all categories of metacognition, with D students having the higher means
and medians. While trying to account for this seeming inconsistency, content knowledge from
calculus I and calculus II, based on the grade received in each course, was considered and it was
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found that students receiving a D in the differential equations course had significantly higher
scores in calculus I and students receiving a C in the differential equations course had
significantly higher scores in calculus II.
When considering Class 1 versus Class 2 the C students were significantly different in the
declarative metacognition scores. All other comparisons, by grade received in the course with
metacognition scores or by grade received in the course with calculus preparation, were not
significantly different. With the analyses done, no evidence arises that would indicate why the
classes had the differing metacognitive scores.
It is apparent from the findings above that it would be difficult to predict a student’s
course performance, as measured by the grade in the course, by considering their scores in
declarative, procedural, and conditional metacognition. While it seems reasonable that B students
would have higher metacognitive levels than C students (as seen in Class 2), the pattern does not
hold with other students in Class 2. In fact, the D students (Class 2) had higher metacognitive
levels than C students. This is not consistent with the results from other studies that used the
MAI instrument with undergraduates in introductory education psychology (Shraw & Dennison,
1994) and mathematics (Md. Yunus & Ali, 2008) which indicated that students with higher
metacognitive awareness have higher academic performances.
This analysis indicates that being “metacognitively aware” about one’s cognitive
knowledge does not necessarily translate into higher academic performance in this academic
context.
VI. Future Work.
Pressley and Ghatala’s (1990) conclusion that higher metacognitive levels did not necessarily
lead to higher academic achievement was borne out in this research. Because students who
received a D in the differential equations course did not necessarily enter the course more
prepared than the C students, it is obvious that there is much more going on with the students’
thinking than was analyzed in this study. The questions raised from this study have led the
author to wonder how D students are using the control aspect of metacognition in their learning.
Are these students setting low goals for themselves, yet are not studying appropriately to master
material even at that level (Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999)? Are they studying the easier topics and
not getting to the harder topics (Metcalfe & Kornell, 2004)? Do these students spend little or no
time planning their problem solving strategies (Schoenfeld, 1992; Stillman & Galbraith, 1998)?
When they have solved problems incorrectly do they examine where things went wrong and
learn from that (Schoenfeld, 1985)?
It would be of interest to identify how students in differential equations control their
study, and perhaps be able to answer questions like those above. If questions of these types can
be answered, at least to some degree, it would then be helpful to build into the differential
equations course ways to introduce productive metacognitive tools that would help the students
to be more successful.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by a “Designing for Learning Success” grant from the Office of the
Provost, Boise State University, and by the Boise State Teaching Scholars Program. The author

Journal of the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning, Vol. 13, No. 1, February 2013.
josotl.indiana.edu

107

Smith, M.J.

would also like to thank Dr. Margaret Kinzel and Dr. Susan Shadle for their careful reading and
comments of this paper and to the reviewers’ for their helpful comments.
Appendix
Appendix 1. Metacognition Survey Used.
Instructions: Please put a mark on the number line that corresponds to how true or false you feel
the statement is for you in a mathematics course. Zero implies completely false and 100 implies
completely true.
1. I try to use strategies that have worked in the past. (PK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

2. I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses. (DK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

3. I know what kind of information is most important to learn. (DK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

4. I am good at organizing information. (DK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

5. I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use. (PK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

6. I learn best when I know something about the topic. (CK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

7. I know what the teacher expects me to learn. (DK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

8. I am good at remembering information. (DK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

9. I use different learning strategies depending on the situation. (CK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100
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10. I have control over how well I learn. (DK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

11. I can motivate myself to learn when I need to. (CK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

12. I am aware of what strategies I use when I study. (PK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

13. I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses. (CK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

14. I am a good judge of how well I understand something. (DK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

15. I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically. (PK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

16. I know when each strategy I use will be most effective. (CK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100

17. I learn more when I am interested in the topic. (DK)
0---------10---------20---------30---------40---------50---------60---------70---------80---------90---------100
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